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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(or are we?) that trial by battle and the ordeal were worthless machin-
ery for the attainment of justice. How clear are we that the methods
and procedures now employed in the settlement of legal disputes are
adequate vehicles for justice?
The quest for truth involves what the lawyer calls "getting the
facts." The facts must be had before a court can make a decision in
a controversy, and often, as many good lawyers have discovered, when
the facts underlying a dispute are found, the dispute is resolved with-
out litigation. But, the essential facts are, often elusive and witnesses
hard to find or obscure in their testimony. It is here, in getting at the
facts and so arriving at the truth of a situation, that the man of science
can often make a valuable contribution.
In a cruder age, when the procedures we now employ in the law
had their beginnings, the scientist had not yet put in his appearance,
and so it is that there still is a want of awareness of his potential serv-
ices to the law. Scientific crime detection is just in its infancy. We
still are far from a full realization of the contributions available to
criminal law administration from the psychiatrist and the criminologist.
An explosion occurs and people are killed and property destroyed. The
observations of one chemical engineer based on his investigations of the
situation may be more reliable on the causes of the explosion than the
testimony of a dozen eyewitnesses.
This, indeed, is a scientific age and the law must ever make increas-
ing use of the scientist in the settlement of disputes. But even so we
must not underestimate the place occupied in this scene by the men
trained in the law. The scientist can give us great impetus in our
search for facts-in our quest for truth-but it remains for the lawyer
to assemble the facts applicable to a concrete controversy and it remains
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As most of those here have graduated from the Law School within
the last twenty-five years, I know that I am in the presence of very
learned men. For my own part, lately my thoughts have been turned to
* Late Justice of the United States Supreme Court. An address delivered at a
dinner of the Harvard Law School Association in honor of Professor C. C. Lang-
dell, June 25, 1895. Reproduced from Speeches, Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1918, by courtesy of the publishers.
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cold, unhappy, far-off things,
And battles long ago";
and when once the ghosts of the dead fifers of thirty years since begin
to play in my head, the laws are silent. And yet as I look around me,
I think to myself, like Correggio, "I too am, or at least have been, a
pedagogue." And as such I will venture a reflection.
Learning, my learned brethren, is a very good thing. I should be
the last to undervalue it, having done my share of quotation from the
Year Books. But it is liable to lead us astray. The law, so far as it
depends on learning, is indeed, as it has been called, the government of
the living by the dead. To a very considerable extent no doubt it is
inevitable that the living should be so governed. The past gives us our
vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination; we cannot get away
from it. There is, too, a peculiar logical pleasure in making manifest
the continuity between what we are doing and what has been done be-
fore. But the present has a right to govern itself so far as it can; and
it ought always to be remembered that historical continuity with the past
is not a duty, it is only a necessity.
I hope that the time is coming when this thought will bear fruit. An
ideal system of law should draw its postulates and its legislative justifica-
tion from science. As it is now, we rely upon tradition, or vague senti-
ment, or the fact that we never thought of any other way of doing
things, as our only warrant for rules which we enforce with as much
confidence as if they embodied revealed wisdom. Who here can give
reasons of any different kind for believing that half the criminal law
does not do more harm than good? Our forms of contract, instead of
being made once for all, like a yacht, on lines of least resistance, are
accidental relics of early notions, concerning which the learned dispute.
How much has reason had to do in deciding how far, if at all, it is
expedient for the State to meddle with the domestic relations? And so
I might go on through the whole law.
The Italians have begun to work upon the notion that the founda-
tions of the law ought to be scientific, and, if our civilization does not
collapse, I feel pretty sure that the regiment or division that follows us
will carry that flag. Our own word seems the last always; yet the
change of emphasis from an argument in Plowden to one in the time
of Lord Ellenborough, or even from that to one in our own day, is as
marked as the difference between Cowley's poetry and Shelley's. Other
changes as great will happen. And so the eternal procession moves on,
we in the front for the moment; and, stretching away against the un-
attainable sky, the black spearheads of the army that has been passing
in unbroken line already for near a thousand years.
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